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Abstract
We investigate the implications of scal fatigue governmentsdeclining
ability to increase primary scal balances with rising public debt utilising
the cubic policy rule estimated by Ghosh et al. (2013). We characterize
its equilibrium debt-output ratios and scal space, and analyze its dynamic
stability in the deterministic (long-run) case. There may be up to three
equilibria, of which the intermediate one will typically require a stability
criterion stricter than scal solvency. We illustrate numerically for six de-
veloped economies.
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1 Introduction
How does scal fatigue governmentsdeclining ability to increase their pri-
mary (non-interest) surplus in response to rising debt levels  a¤ect expected
debt-output ratios and debt sustainability? In this paper we solve for the multiple
long-run equilibrium debt ratios under the scal fatigue denition of Ghosh, Kim,
Mendoza, Ostry and Qureshi (2013) and characterize their dynamic stability. Fis-
cal policy rules where the primary budget balance responds in non-linear fashion
to debt accumulation have multiple turning points, resulting in potentially multi-
ple equilibrium expected debt ratios.1 In turn, each equilibrium implies a di¤erent
measure of long-run scal space, i.e. the distance between the expected debt
ratio and the endogenous debt limit beyond which default becomes unavoidable.
We chart the resulting challenge for sustaining a stable public debt ratio.
For the United States, the persistent scal deterioration in the aftermath of the
Great Recession is an unprecedented response to historical debt buildup events;
see DErasmo et al. (2015). Long term scal prospects are also worrying for the
euro area following the sovereign debt crisis in periphery countries. Eichengreen
and Panizza (2016) nd that the magnitude and persistence of primary surpluses
required for the single currency block to meet its 60 percent debt ratio target
(Fiscal Compact 2030 ) is very rare, particularly when output growth is weak.
1Fiscal reaction functions mapping the lagged debt ratio to the primary surplus have attracted
attention well before the Great Recession and ensuing public debt overhang. Monetary and scal
policy reacting to debt shocks can be traced to Leeper (1991), who dened passive policy as
being constrained by private and public optimization, while active policy is unconstrained.
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The long run impact of worsening primary balances matters in two ways. First,
insofar as a positive primary surplus response to debt accumulation is su¢ cient
for sustainable debt dynamics under linear scal policy rules. This scal respon-
sibility condition, due to Bohn (1995, 1998, 2008), has facilitated model-based
tests of debt sustainability across countries and over time.2 Of course, a scally
irresponsible government may yet bring scal policy back on track at some future
point, while being scally responsible may not prevent ever-increasing debt ratios
and required primary surpluses exceeding GDP. Second, at high debt ratios gov-
ernments nd raising taxes or cutting primary expenditure increasingly di¢ cult,
and scal fatiguesymptoms are amplied if output growth falters.3 Contribut-
ing factors include government complacence because of cheap borrowing rates, i.e.
the opposite of developing countries feeling market pressure; low tax compliance
during episodes of weak growth resulting in a procyclical tax base, a feature which
Talvi and Végh (2005) had identied for developing countries; as well as societys
willingness to live with high debt, e¤ectively discounting the risk of nancial crises
when a public backstop becomes essential; see Ostry, Ghosh and Espinoza (2015).
Against this background, Ghosh et al. (2013) formalized the scal fatigue
notion by introducing a cubic debt rule in which the scal stance eventually de-
teriorates at an increasing rate as the debt ratio grows, counteracting any scal
2DErasmo, Mendoza and Zhang (2015) and Mendoza and Ostry (2008) survey model-based
tests for developed countries and emerging market economies.
3See Alesina et al. (2014), Arrelano and Bai (2016) and the references therein. We review the
empirical evidence on scal response coe¢ cients in Section 4.
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responsibility operating through the rules conditional linear response. The gov-
ernment then faces an endogenous debt limit beyond which it is unable to adjust
the primary balance to rising debt and has to default. Assuming such a descrip-
tion of scal fatigue is empirically relevant, the response of the primary balance to
lagged debt changes sign twice. Denoting the debt-GDP ratio as d, Fig. 1 below
presents three possible cases where the primary balance s = f(d) intersects the
growth-adjusted debt repayment schedule (r g)d, where r is the real interest rate
and g real output growth:
FIGURE 1 HERE
Equilibrium Debt Ratios with Fiscal Fatigue
In principle there can be up to three equilibrium debt ratios. However, the scal
behavior implied by f(d) to the left of its rst turning point seems largely an
artefact of the cubic assumption: it implies ever-growing budget surpluses with
declining debt ratios. We thus consider Case I with a unique intersection in this
low debt region to be unrealistic. Of the remaining, Case II includes an intersection
in this region which we may again ignore, while in Case III the unique intersection
occurs in the high debt region which we will argue is unstable. Thus we focus on
the upward- and subsequent downward-sloping sections of f(d). Fig. 2 zooms in
on Case II:
FIGURE 2 HERE
Endogenous Debt Limit and Fiscal Space
3
The government is scally responsible in the intermediate region extending between
turning points dmin and dmax, and scal fatigue sets in to the right of dmax. In the
high debt region between dmax and the rightmost intersection, d, growing debt is no
longer o¤set by increasing surpluses. Any threshold debt-output ratio triggering
output decline is likely located within this region.4 Lastly, d represents the debt
limit specic to scal policy rule f(d). Beyond that, on average the primary balance
cannot roll over accruing public debt and default becomes unavoidable.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, there are up to three
long-run equilibria, corresponding to the real solutions of a cubic polynomial in
the unconditionally expected debt ratio. The equilibrium magnitudes depend non-
linearly on the linear and higher order unconditional comovement between real
interest rates and debt. Second, scal responsibility (f 0 > 0) is a weak criterion of
debt sustainability if scal adjustment is a non-linear function of the debt ratio.
Accordingly, we show that only the equilibrium in the intermediate debt region is
dynamically stable while the two extreme ones are unstable. Our stability crite-
rion, adopted also by Ghosh et al. (2013), is that the expected debt ratio should
converge to a nite proportion of output in expectation. This requires that the
scal reaction function slope exceeds the growth-adjusted real interest rate at each
equilibrium point: f 0 > r   g. Assuming r > g, dynamic stability is more restric-
tive than scal responsibility as the latter cannot rule out an explosive debt-output
4Lo and Rogo¤ (2015) review the available rationales for sluggish post-crisis global growth.
On the theoretical and empirical debate linking public debt levels and output growth see Ostry,
Ghosh and Espinoza (2015) and Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2015).
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ratio under scal fatigue. Therefore, a sustainable scal policy must on average
react more aggressively to debt buildups than under a linear scal rule.
The framework sheds light on scal policys short term potential to destabilize
the debt ratio. Referring to Fig. 2 above, for a given slope of (r  g)d and starting
with an intersection in debt region [dmin; dmax], consider a short-term shock to the
debt ratio, e.g. because of a nancial crisis-triggered recession. The government
then needs to run a bigger surplus; thus scal policy following the rule is procycli-
cal, amplifying the downturn and countering conventional wisdom on the role of
automatic stabilizers.5 Positive comovement between debt and real interest rates
will further worsen the recessionary impact, while negative comovement will miti-
gate it. By contrast, a permanent shift up in r   g (capturing secular stagnation
and/or sovereign default concerns) requires a more aggressive scal stance if the
government wishes to maintain the same debt ratio as before. At the current level,
interest payments exceed the mandated surplus so debt starts to increase until it
hits a new intersection above d. Such long-term shifts then lead to countercyclical
scal policy, consistent with the consensus view.6
The expected debt limit specic to the scal rule and the scal space available
to the government follow as a corollary. While Ghosh et al. (2013) work out actual
5On the potential for self-reinforcing austerity measures during the eurozone debt crisis see
Alesina et al. (2014), Collignon (2012), Eichengreen and Panizza (2016) and Ghosh, Ostry and
Qureshi (2013).
6See Lane (2003). However, the consensus whereby scal policy tends to be countercyclical
(procyclical) in developed (developing) economies may be shifting since the nancial crisis to
encompass the nancial cycle; see Borio, Lombardi and Zampolli (2016).
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scal space in a stochastic environment by simultaneously solving for the default
probability, the market interest rate and the scal rules endogenous debt limit, we
focus on expected scal space, dened as the (non-negative) distance between the
stable equilibrium debt ratio  if it exists  and the expected debt limit. If the
only real-valued equilibrium is unstable, however, it coincides with the debt limit
beyond which default is certain  at least in our deterministic long-run setting 
hence expected scal space is zero.
We employ a cubic debt rule featuring the scal response coe¢ cients of Ghosh
et al. (2013) to evaluate the long run debt ratios and implied debt limit of 6
developed economies. The unconditional moments and linear and nonlinear co-
movements between each countrys debt-GDP and its 10-year government bond
yields are computed for 1995-2015 under two exogenous growth scenarios: po-
tential (3 percent) and post-crisis (0:5 percent) average output growth. The
numerical exercise is meant to illustrate the analytical framework; in particular,
our non-structural approach means that the equilibrium debt ratios and implied
long-run scal space (or lack thereof) need not be optimal, or indeed socially desir-
able.7 That said, three features stand out. First, with the exception of Japan and
Italy the countries in question have three equilibria. The stable debt ratios range
from near 40 percent (the United States, fast growth) to 101 percent (Italy, slow
growth ). Of these countries, expected scal space is greater for the U.S. than the
7A governments own welfare function (expected reelection probability) may di¤er from the
social optimum. Collard et al. (2016) show that such a reluctant defaulterwill opt for much
higher debt ratios than the standard strategic cost-benet comparison would imply.
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euro area economies, with the U.K. in between. Japan stands out with a single
unstable debt ratio exceeding 250 percent of GDP under both growth scenarios,
suggesting its expected scal space is zero. Second, a deteriorating macroeconomic
environment  higher real rates and/or slower growth  raises the stable debt
ratio and lowers the debt limit, shrinking expected scal space on both counts.
Conversely, a more benign macroeconomic environment widens the governments
expected scal maneuver room. This qualitative feature sets our model apart from
Collard (2016), whose reluctant defaulters optimal debt ratio closely tracks the
maximum sustainable debt limit . Third, introducing excess scal fatigue raises
the stable debt ratio and lowers expected scal space across the board. Italy then
also displays a single unstable expected debt ratio albeit near zero, unlike Japans.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3
contrasts linear and nonlinear debt rules; Section 4 derives the unconditionally ex-
pected debt ratio(s) consistent with the cubic specication of Ghosh et al. (2013);
Section 5 illustrates for six advanced economies; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
To the best of our knowledge, Ghosh et al. (2013) and Ghosh, Ostry and Qureshi
(2013) are the only previous studies explicitly addressing scal fatigue. An excep-
tion is Shiamptanis (2015), who also nds the required stability criterion is tighter
than those proposed by Bohn (1998).
Our non-structural approach shares Ostry, Ghosh and Espinozas (2015) focus
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on green-zonecases with ample scal space, as opposed to the yellow- or red-
zone where scal space is narrow or has run out. Further, our large numerical
debt ratios and implied expected scal space are consistent with theoretical work
on the optimal amount of public debt. Following upon Ayagari and McGrattan
(1998) and Holmstron and Tirole (1998), Angeletos et al. (2013) show that public
debt alleviates a nancial friction by increasing the aggregate amount of collateral
in crisis times. In a similar vein, Kocherlakota (2015) has suggested that issuing
more debt may yield a higher natural real interest rate if Ricardian equivalence
fails, thus moving the policy rate away from its zero bound and contributing to
nancial stability. Collard et al. (2015, 2016) have also calibrated high calibrated
debt limits and optimal debt ratios, respectively, by assuming a government will
only default as a last resort if it cannot service accruing debt, i.e. if its primary
surplus falls short of (r   g)dt.
In non-structural models, a linear budget response to lagged debt implies a
unique expected debt ratio; see DErasmo et al.s (2015) review of Bohns con-
tributions. Typically, structural models of scal policy with endogenous default
also yield a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium (Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Ar-
relano (2008)).8 If there are multiple long run debt ratios consistent with a scal
rule then identifying the stable one(s) becomes an important issue for debt man-
agement policy (Wyplosz (2013)). Equilibrium selection matters also for closed-
economy DSGE models whose determinacy requires the equilibrium debt ratio
8An exception is Pergallini (2014); however, he assumes a conditionally increasing marginal
scal response to rising debt, which rules out scal fatigue.
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to log-linearize around its steady state (Linnemann (2006)), and open-economy
models in which exogenous deviations of the debt ratio around its steady-state(s)
determine the currency risk premium (Schmitt-Grihe and Uribe (2003)). There
is also research where debt ceilings arise endogenously through state-dependent
La¤er curves limiting governmentsability to raise taxes (Bi (2012), Arrelano and
Bai (2016)). Their debt limits are time-varying with productivity, government
spending and transfer shocks and have state-dependent distributions, whereas our
measure is unconditionally expected.
Structural innite-horizon models are better suited to analyze cases where sov-
ereign default is imminent. For the euro area, Nerlich and Reuter (2015) report
that procyclicality is stronger if countries have more scal space. Decit bias is
stronger if a government believes that the likelihood of default is remote, all else
equal. In turn, its scal maneuver room tends to be higher with scal rules than
without. Bi (2012) also nds that longer term scal reforms (if credible) have a
better chance of reducing debt than short-term austerity measures.
Lastly, we assume that output growth is stochastic in principle, but indepen-
dent of everything and has constant expectation, and we allow the unconditional
comovement between real interest rates and debt ratios to take either sign.9
9By assuming the default probability is always increasing in the debt ratio, Ghosh et al. (2013)
only allow a positive covariance between the levels, which excludes nancial safe havens. For the
U.S., Laubach (2009) nds that linear correlations are positive. For the eurozone, Ghosh, Ostry
and Qureshi (2013) nd an o¤setting e¤ect through investor expectations of a nancial bailout.
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3 Linear and non-linear debt rules
Denoting the period-t debt-output ratio as dt, the ratio of the gross return on
public debt to output growth from t to t + 1 is 1 + rt   gt, where 1 + rt is the
1-period gross real interest rate contracted in period t and gt is real output growth.
The debt ratio evolves as
dt+1 = (1 + rt   gt) dt   st+1 (1)
where st+1 is the primary scal balance in period t + 1, i.e. tax receipts less gov-
ernment spending in percent of output. We assume rt is stochastic with constant
unconditional expectation E(rt) = r and variance var(rt) = 2r while gt is time-
varying but deterministic. The unconditional variance of dt is var(dt) = 2d, and
we dene the unconditional comovement of the levels, squares and cubes of 1 + rt
and dt as  = covf1 + rt; dtg,  = covf(1 + rt)2; d2tg and   = covf(1 + rt)3; d3tg re-
spectively. Note that to obtain , ,   6= 0 it su¢ ces that fdtg is unconditionally
correlated with the real interest rate process frtg.
The benchmark linear debt rule for determining st+1 is just
st+1 = f(dt) + t+1
= dt + t+1 (2)
t = Zt + "t ,
where "  (0; ") is an i.i.d. shock to the primary balance and t+1 captures all
determinants of st+1 other than lagged debt, including proxies for temporary and
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cyclical uctuations in output and government spending (Zt+1).10
Bohn (1998) showed that f 0(d) =  > 0 is su¢ cient for the debt ratio to be
sustainable over time, i.e. for the innite sequence of scal policies to meet the
governments intertemporal budget and no-Ponzi constraints:
dt 1 = st +
1X
j=1
Et

Rjt
 1  st+j

(3)
0 = lim
n!1
Et[Rjt
 1  dt+n] (4)
where Rjt 1 = (1 + rjt) 1 = 
jEt
h
u0(ct+j)
u0(ct)
i
is the gross return on period-t debt
maturing at t+j and  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. Under plausible assumptions
about frtg, Bohns proof only requires that t and the present value of output are
nite.
Mendoza and Ostry (2008) show that a scal authority committed to a linear
debt rule as in (2) delivers the expected debt ratio:
Edt  d =  + (1  )
(1 + r)  r (5)
Eq. (5) follows from setting the linear coe¢ cient in the debt rule as (1 + rt  gt),
and r and  are the unconditional means of the growth-adjusted real interest rate
and temporary government spending, respectively. Thus, provided  < 1 a worse
macroeconomic environment results in lower d, and vice versa. Further, assuming
 = 0, countries with higher  (more scally responsible) will tend to have lower
expected debt ratios than those with lower . This counterfactual prediction arises
10The specic probability density function of "t is not required for our long-run purposes. It
is critical, however, for short-run dynamic stability; see Section 4.2 and Ghosh et al. (2013).
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because developing countries with procyclical scal policy (countercyclical primary
balances) tend to have higher  in response to their greater macro-nancial risk
( > 0), the latter independently raising d given . By contrast, an important
reason why developed countries have historically been characterized by more coun-
tercyclical scal policy is that they are perceived to be less risky, and may even
function as nancial safe havens.11 Lastly, as the default probability can only be
zero, if the government if scally responsible, or one if it is not, the economys
actual scal space  the gap between d and the debt limit  is either innite
( > 0) or zero (  0).
Based on the premise that the primary balances response to debt accumulation
is likely globally non-linear  i.e. over the whole debt range  in the rest of this
paper we study the cubic functional form of Ghosh et al. (2013), who specify
f(dt) as a continuously di¤erentiable cubic polynomial. The non-linear debt rule
in terms of dt is:
st+1 = f(dt) + t+1
= 0dt + 
0d2t +  
0d3t + t+1 (6)
t+1 = Zt+1 + t+1
where   (0; ) is a primary balance disturbance similar to " above. We choose
11There is strong evidence for  > 0 in developing countries; see Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
and Arrelano (2008). Safe haven status ( < 0) is usually reserved for the United States and
Japan; see respectively Prasad (2014) and Rogo¤ and Tashiro (2015).
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to specify f in terms of the interest-adjusted debt ratio edt = (1 + rt)dt and write:
st+1 = f(edt) + t+1
= edt + ed2t +  ed3t + t+1 (7)
t+1 = Zt+1 + t+1
  
0
1 + rt
,   
0
(1 + rt)2
,    
0
(1 + rt)3
(8)
The edt measure is also implicit in Mendoza and Ostrys (2008) unconditional deriva-
tion. The transformation simplies the analytics and is without loss of generality
as rt is known at time t. Empirically, substituting rt = r guarantees the scal
response coe¢ cients are not stochastic. Di¤erentiating eq. (7) with respect to edt
yields dmin; dmax =
 
p
2 3 
3 
. Real-valued turning points require   2
3
, which
is always satised for  > 0 and  < 0.
We are interested in debt rules featuring  < 0. Referring to Fig. 2, for
debt ratios in the range [dmin; dmax], i.e. where f intersects the roll-over payment
schedule from below, scal policy responds to growing debt by setting a bigger
surplus. For example, a negative period-t shock to the surplus drops the economy
vertically below the d intersection, so in period t + 1 the debt ratio rises above
d. In that period, assuming no further shocks, the debt rule forces st+1 to exceed
(r   g)dt+1 so debt is reduced and the economy returns towards d.
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4 Equilibrium debt ratios
4.1 Existence
We derive the unconditionally expected debt ratios obtaining under cubic debt
rule (7) and investigate their stability. Henceforth we set gt = g, all t, so rt   g
follows rt up to a constant. Applying eq. (7) and edt = (1 + rt)dt into eq. (1), the
debt ratio evolves as
dt+1 = (1 + rt   g)dt   (1 + rt)dt (9)
 (1 + rt)2d2t    (1 + rt)3d3t   t+1
In Appendix A we establish that eq. (9) yields the following cubic polynomial in
the long-run expected debt ratio di :
(d)  d3 + a1d2 + a2d + a3 = 0 (10)
In general (d) has up to three real-valued solutions, denoted di , i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Its coe¢ cients are given by:
a1 = (
2
r + (1 + r)
2)e
a2 = ((1 + r)  (r   g))e  32d (11)
a3 = [  (1  ) +  + (2r + (1 + r)2)2d +   ]e  d3d
with e =    1[r3r + 32r(1 + r)  (1 + r)3] 1.
The behavior of (d) is determined by scal response coe¢ cients ,  and  ;
the three unconditional moments of rt and dt; their unconditional covariances ,
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,  ; the average growth-adjusted real interest rate r   g; and . The number of
real solutions is a function of D = Q3 +R2, where
Q =
3a2   a21
9
, R =
9a1a2   27a3   2a31
54
(12)
D > 0 implies one real and two complex roots; D = 0 implies all real roots and at
least two equal; and D < 0 implies three real and unequal roots. Therefore, the
likelihood of a single equilibrium in the high debtregion  Case III in Fig. 1
 cannot be ruled out in principle. This point will become salient in Section 5.
4.2 Stability
We characterize the dynamic stability of expected debt ratio solutions in the de-
terministic case, and briey discuss the implications of rt being stochastic. When
rt = r, the debt ratio in eq. (9) follows the rst-order di¤erence equation:
dt+1 = (r   g)dt   f(dt)  t+1 (13)
Bohns (1998) su¢ cient condition for scal solvency (f 0(d) > 0) is a weak criterion
of debt sustainability. For example, it would allow the debt ratio to grow without
limit as long as the accompanying surpluses grow at some positive rate. Although
the expected present value of debt would then be nite and the economy solvent,
this might require primary surpluses exceeding GDP. But with scal fatigue such
large surpluses become impossible; a stronger condition which keeps the debt ratio
around some stable level is required.
In Appendix B we show that equilibrium debt ratio di , i 2 f1; 2; 3g is stable to
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small perturbations t (shocks to the primary balance) if:
f 0(di ) > r   g (14)
Inequality (14) coincides with Ghosh et al.s (2013) stability condition in the de-
terministic case. Thus, di is stable if at that debt ratio f intersects the growth-
adjusted interest rate schedule r   g from below, corresponding to Fig. 1, Case II
where only the intermediate real solution (d2) of (d
) is stable. Thus, minimum
solution d1 and debt limit d

3 are both unstable because f
0 < 0 unless r < g, which
is ruled out by a modied golden rule commanding broad theoretical and empirical
support in the long-run (Blanchard and Fischer (1989)).
Settingdt+1 = 0 in (13), di¤erentiating eq. (7) with respect to di and plugging
in inequality (14) yields:
3 (1 + r)2d2i + 2(1 + r)d

i +  
r   g
1 + r
> 0 (15)
We denote the LHS quadratic polynomial roots by d and d and assume these are
real and distinct. Given  < 0, inequality (15) holds for di 2 [d; d], where:
[d; d] =
"
1
3 (1 + r)
 
 
s
2   3 

  r   g
1 + r
!#
(16)
Expected debt ratios are dynamically stable in the region dened by this closed
interval. A su¢ cient condition for real-valued d and d then is:
 
s
3 

  r   g
1 + r

(17)
In turn, assuming  > 0 and  < 0, inequality (17) is satised if
 <
r   g
1 + r
(18)
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The tighter stability condition under non-linear scal rules imposes an upper bound
for the scal responsibility coe¢ cient (). E¤ectively, violating inequality (18)
means the economy is in the single intersection Cases I and III of Fig. 1.
For stochastic rt, di¤erence equation (9) becomes stochastic as the interest-
adjusted scal response coe¢ cients ,  and  in eq. (7) are random variables
correlated with the debt process fdtg. The stability of the solutions to (9) will
depend on the magnitude of these correlations and the probability density function
of primary balance shocks (t+1) to t+1. In the short run, a shock to dt rotates
the (rt   g)dt line as well as f(dt), the latter working through the changes in , ,
 . It is then likely that f 0 > rt   g is not strong enough to force a nite expected
debt ratio unless Corrfrt; dtg is very negative. Intuitively, stability may be easier
to attain for safe haven countries as their rollover interest payments go down with
debt accumulation, at least in the short term. Conversely, Corr(rt; dt) > 0 makes
stability less likely, all else equal. In that case, an extra scal disciplinecondition
such as f 00 > 0 may be required to make di stable to disturbances in the primary
balance.12
4.3 Expected scal space
The expected scal maneuver room (in output terms) available to a government
implementing a cubic debt rule such as (7) is the distance between the intermediate
12A full stability analysis for di¤erence equations with stochastic parameters (response coef-
cients) would require imposing strong restrictions on the underlying processes frtg and fdtg.
These lie beyond the scope of this paper.
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(stable) and the maximum of the three real-valued solutions of polynomial (d)
in eq. (10), if they exist. The largest solution, d3, corresponds to the maximum
intersection point between f(d) and (r   g)d in Fig. 2. It measures the nite
expected debt limit, denoted d, beyond which the debt stock cannot be rolled
over. The situation is irreversible, at least in expectation, because beyond d the
government is unable to raise taxes and/or cut spending in line with rising debt and
the primary balance worsens at an increasing rate. Alternatively, if (d) = 0 has
a single real solution, that is unstable and coincides with the debt limit. Expected
scal space is then zero and public debt dynamics are unsustainable.13
Therefore, expected scal space S is either zero or the positive distance between
the endogenous deterministic debt limit and stable expected debt ratio d2:
d  arg max
i=f1;2;3g
[di ]) (19)
S = d3   d2 if D  0 , d  d3 (20)
S = 0 if D > 0 , d  d
Compared to the linear case where declining growth-adjusted real interest rates
unambigously lower d (from Section 2 recall that S is innite provided  > 0),
there are now two reinforcing e¤ects: higher g and/or lower r lowers expected debt
ratio d2 in the stable (upward-sloping) debt region. At the same time, in the scal
fatigue (downward-sloping) region, faster growth leads to higher d as it alleviates
the debt burden; this is what Ostry et al. (2015) call the organic approach to
13In practice, the government is likely to lose market access and default well before the expected
debt limit is reached, at least on the external component of public debt.
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debt reduction. The net impact of (r   g) < 0 when f(d) is a cubic function
then is to increase expected scal space. Conversely, a secular deterioration in the
macroeconomic environment implies less long-run scal space.
5 Long-run debt ratios: numerical illustration
We evaluate the expected public debt ratios, debt limit and scal space of France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the United States in three steps. First,
solving polynomial (d) requires the interest-adjusted scal response coe¢ cients
, ,  . Table 1 reviews the scal response estimates for cubic debt rule (6):
Table 1. Fiscal Response Coe¢ cient Estimates14
Sample Linear 0 Quadratic 0 Cubic  0
Bohn (1998) 1916-1995 U.S. 0:028; 0:054 0:106  0:012
Bohn (2008) 1793-2003 0:028; 0:147  
MO 1990-2005 0:022; 0:038    
DMZ 1791-2014 U.S. 0:078; 0:105 0:003  
1951-2013 0:028; 0:069  
Ghosh et al. 1970-2007  0:2249 0:0034  0:00001
1985-2005  0:0864 0:0017  0:00001
14All estimates are for developed countries. MO and DMZ refer to Mendoza and Ostry (2008)
and DErasmo, Mendoza and Zhang (2015). The non-linear coe¢ cients often measure the con-
ditional scal impact of deviations from a unique steady-state proxied by the average debt ratio.
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While responsible scal behavior emerges over long time spans, to the best of our
knowledge Ghosh et al.s (2013) dynamic panel of 23 developed countries is the
only study reporting negative  estimates. As discussed in Section 1, this is in line
with a possible structural shift in the debt rule occuring post-2008 (DErasmo et al.
(2015)). The positive 0 estimates are consistent with inequality (17): a positive
quadratic response is required for stability. The cubic coe¢ cient  0 is small but
signicantly negative, consistent with the increasing fatigueassumption at high
debt ratios. Accordingly, we adopt these authorssignicant coe¢ cients from 1970-
2007.15 The empirical t of these coe¢ cients is shown in Fig. 3:
FIGURE 3 HERE
Estimated Fiscal Reaction Functions
To highlight the sensitivity of the long run to scal fatigue, the green line shows
the scal reaction function if the cubic response coe¢ cient is raised by 20 percent:
from the Ghosh et al. (2013) estimate to  =  0:000012. The two schedules
largely overlap through debt ratios around 80 percent, after which they progres-
sively diverge. The primary balance deteriorates rapidly when debt exceeds 150
percent of GDP, suggesting that long-term consolidation is highly sensitive to the
cubic scal response as debt mounts. We return to this excess fatiguescenario
below.
15The control variables a¤ecting the primary balance in the preferred specication include the
output gap, ination, trade openness and the price of crude oil.
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In the second step, the rst three (unconditional) moments and the linear and
nonlinear covariances between debt ratios and real bond yields required for the
polynomial coe¢ cients of (d) are computed using annual general government
gross debt ratios and monthly real 10-year government bond yields for each country
j over the period 1995-2015. The descriptive statistics are in Table 2:
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: 1995-201516
10-year yields FRA GER ITA JAP U.K. U.S.
Mean r (%) 2:46 2:17 2:82 1:19 2:65 1:48
Std.dev. r (%) 1:34 1:48 1:56 1:15 1:94 1:33
Skewness r 0:36  0:14 1:63  1:09  0:04 0:13
Debt ratios
Mean d (%) 70:8 66:2 111:7 196:0 55:6 92:7
Std.dev. d (%) 13:4 8:0 10:4 36:0 19:9 24:9
Skewness d 0:77 0:49 0:62 0:08 0:73 0:23
Corrf1 + rt; dtg  0:76  0:86 0:11  0:70  0:82  0:46
f(1 + rt);dtg 0:10 0:04 0:25 0:25  0:15 0:12
16For consistency with the interest-adjusted debt transformation in eq. (9), the linear and
non-linear co-movements are computed by matching the average rt in January of a given year
with the debt ratio of the previous year. We show the correlation coe¢ cients of both levels and
rst di¤erences and do not report the unscaled covariance measures (, ,  ); they are available
upon request. Data sources: ECB, Eurostat and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (FRED).
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The average 10-year real bond yields lie below their historical averages as sovereign
term structures have attened substantially since 2008.17 With the exception of
Italy, the negative co-movement between real yields and debt ratio levels would
seem to indicate these sovereign debt markets function as safe havens. That is mis-
leading, however, as the negative correlation simply captures the strong positive
(negative) trend in debt ratios (real bond yields) over the period, and particularly
since the global nancial crisis: the correlation coe¢ cients of the rst-di¤erenced
data are all mildly positive except the U.K. We then adjust Ghosh et al.s (2013) s-
cal response coe¢ cients 0, 0,  0 by country js average real government bond yield
(ri), by eq. (8), and obtain interest-adjusted coe¢ cients j, j,  j, j = f1; :::; 6g re-
ecting country-specic macroecomic environments. However, we uniformly apply
two exogenous average growth rates: 3 percent (corresponding to pre-crisis poten-
tial output) or 0:5 percent (post-crisis), in line with lower potential growth; see
IMF (2015).18 Lastly, we set average temporary government spending to  = 0:022,
from Bohn (1998).
17The average 10-year real yield of the six economies is 2:13 percent per annum, against a
steady-state annual real interest rate of 3:8 percent calibrated by DErasmo et al. (2015) for
the commonly used deep parameter values (; ; ). Also note the pronounced asymmetry in
Japanese government bond returns, likely reecting investorsone-sided expectations of future
bond yield increases; see Fujiwara et al. (2011).
18Mendoza and Ostry (2008) employ 5 and 2:5 percent, DErasmo et al. (2015) impose zero
growth-adjusted real rates (r = g), while Ghosh et al. (2013) use the 5-year country-specic
average of the IMFs projected real output growth. In their 2013-2019 scal projections, Eichen-
green and Panizza (2016) use negative growth-adjusted real interest rates for Japan, the U.K.
and the U.S.
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In the third step, the interest-adjusted response coe¢ cients are applied to poly-
nomial (10) to compute up to three equilibrium debt ratios di , i = f1; :::; 3g for
each economy. From eq. (19) recall that, if a country-specic expected debt limit
d exists, it is uniquely determined as the maximum positive real solution of Y (d).
Hence, subtracting either d2 or the only real solution, as the case may be, from d
yields each economys expected scal space. The results are in Table 3:
Table 3. Long-run Debt Ratios and Fiscal Space19
Debt ratios (%) FRA GER ITA JAP U.K. U.S.
Actual 96 71 133 243 89 109:7
d1 g = 0:03 3:9 1:5 1:7  12:8 19:6
g = 0:005 3:1 1:2 1:4  9:2 12:0
excess fatigue 3:2 1:2 1:4  9:5 12:6
d2 g = 0:03 67:4 70:9 73:1  51:1 38:7
g = 0:005 94:2 97:7 101:1  78:2 68:5
excess fatigue 114:0 123:5   86:2 72:5
d g = 0:03 269:0 268:0 265:4 295:9 276:4 281:9
g = 0:005 242:9 241:4 237:9 277:1 253:0 259:8
excess fatigue 166:3 158:9  223:3 217:8 198:4
S g = 0:03 201:6 197:1 192:3 0 225:3 243:2
g = 0:005 148:7 143:7 136:8 0 187:9 191:3
excess fatigue 52:3 35:4 0 0 101:7 125:9
19Excess fatigue combines the slow growth scenario (g = 0:005) with  0 =  0:000012, so
 j =  
0
(1+rj)3 , j = f1; :::; 6g.
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We note that France, Germany, U.K. and the U.S. display three long-run debt
ratios, of which the intermediate one (d2) is stable. By contrast, Japans scal
record over the period yields a single unstable equilibrium in all three scenarios
under consideration; Italy is also in this category, but only if there is excess scal
fatigue. Prima facie, these two countries then have zero long-run scal space.20
Of the countries possessing a stable equilibrium, the smallest unstable solution
(d1) is near zero, somewhat higher for the U.S. Then, if average output growth is
at potential, the stable debt ratio coincides with its actual (end-2015) value for
Germany but is far smaller for the other four countries. The eurozone members
long-run debt ratios lie between 65 and 75 percent; they are lower for the U.K
and the U.S. However, if average growth slows to 0:5 percent, the stable debt ratio
rises and its gap with the actual gures drops by about 30 percent of GDP. In that
post-crisis scenario, the eurozone members long-run debt ratio is around 100
percent of GDP, while for Germany it is above its actual value. As slower growth
also lowers the deterministic debt limit, the loss of long-run scal space is greater.
These magnitudes are broadly consistent with recent research. Our stable debt
ratios are lower than the 76 and 60 percent steady-state calibrated by DErasmo
et al. (2015) for the U.S. and EU-15 countries, respectively, while the U.S. histor-
ical gure imputed by Ghosh et al. (2013) is 78:7 percent. Further, with potential
20We note that, as of May 2014, the estimates of Moodys Analytics based on the methodology
of Ghosh et al. (2013) and Ostry et al. (2015) also indicated zero actual scal space for Japan,
Italy and Greece.
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(slow) output growth, the average long-run debt ratio for the three eurozone mem-
bers is 70 (98 ) percent. The EUs Fiscal Compact target debt ratio of 60 percent
for 2030 then appears unrealistic unless growth picks up; see the discussion in
Eichengreen and Panizza (2016). Lastly, Collard et al. (2016) calibrate the opti-
mal debt ratio to 82 percent, far above that obtaining in standard strategic default
models.
In terms of sensitivity analysis, we experiment with the larger scal fatigue
coe¢ cient ( ) discussed in Fig. 3 above. The stable debt ratio rises marginally
from its post-crisislevel, relatively more so for France and Germany. At the same
time, expected debt limits decline substantially for all economies (except Italy and
Japan) so long-run scal space shrinks on both counts. With reference to Fig. 2,
more scal fatigue tends to compressf(d) so its last intersection with (r   g)d
occurs at a lower debt limit d. Of course, actual default may occur before d and
past dmax, the turning point at which scal fatigue sets in, i.e. somewhere in the
range where the threshold debt ratio beyond is detrimental to growth is located.
To summarize, our numerical exercise indicates a need for scal retrenchment
in the potential growth scenario for all countries except Germany, to counter the
public debt buildup.21 In the slow growth scenario, only Italy and the U.S. require
scal consolidation while Germany needs to expand scally to attain its higher
long-run debt ratio. We emphasize these policy implication should be treated with
21Other than deliberate scal retrenchment, reducing public debt can be accomplished or-
ganically, through growth, or opportunistically if/as less distortionary revenue sources become
available; see Ostry et al. (2015).
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caution on several counts. Firstly, our simple numerical exercise primarily serves to
illustrate the analytics. Secondly, our non-structural approach does not claim that
the equilibrium debt ratio underlying the expected scal space (or lack thereof) is
necessarily optimal or, indeed, desirable. In practice, governments might choose to
behave optimally, or they may be self-interested and reluctant to default (Collard
et al. (2016)), thus targeting a higher debt ratio than if they strategically evaluated
costs and benets. That said, a long-term objective of reducing the debt burden
is consistent with the desire to create scal roomagainst future contingencies,
as well as to not risk sacricing output growth beyond some debt ratio threshold,
which we argued lies within the [dmax; d] range in Fig. 2.
6 Concluding remarks
Motivated by post-crisis evidence of scal fatigue in developed economies, in this
paper we studied the long-term implications of the non-linear scal reaction func-
tion (debt rule) proposed and estimated by Ghosh et al. (2013). We found that
scal solvency is satised by up to three expected debt ratios, with their magnitude
a function of the unconditional (linear and non-linear) comovement of real interest
rates and of the two fundamental variablesown moments.
We analyzed dynamic stability in the deterministic (long-run) case, showing
that only the intermediate equilibrium is stable and the stability criterion required
under scal fatigue is stricter than scal solvency. Further, the expected debt limit
beyond which default is unavoidable coincides with the unstable equilibrium in the
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high debt region, and the non-negative distance between that limit and the stable
equilibrium measures the long-run scal space available to the government. We
emphasized that cubic debt rules need not be optimal, or even desirable. Rather,
they o¤er a useful gauge of long-term public debt sustainability insofar as they
describe governmentsaverage scal track record.
More generally, identifying the potential for multiplicity is arguably important
in order ... for policymakers to be aware of the full range of options they can
eventually choose from... (Reinhart et al. (2015), p.S52). In that connection,
while our framework cannot inform on the appropriate speed of scal adjustment, it
may serve as input to medium-term scal consolidation and budgetary framework
design. Classifying stability in the stochastic (short-run) case is an ambitious
anaytical extension which we leave for future research. A novel feature of our
unconditional approach is the expected debt ratios sensitivity to the degree of
(linear and non-linear) comovement between debt and real interest rates. On
average, a country risk premium tends to make attaining stability harder, while
nancial safe haven status renders it easier. Quantifying the long-run impact of
such considerations and that of skewness in real bond yield distributions seem
useful empirical extensions.
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Appendix A. Expected debt ratio existence: proof of eqs. (10)-(11)
Applying the debt rule in eq. (7) to the debt evolution in eq. (9):
dt+1 = (1 + rt   g)dt   (1 + rt)dt (A.1)
 (1 + rt)2d2t    (1 + rt)3d3t   t+1
and taking unconditional expectations yields:
Edt+1 = (1  )Ef(1 + rt)dtg   Ef(1 + rt)2d2tg (A.2)
  Ef(1 + rt)3d3tg   gEdt   
Recall the long-run covariances are   cov(1 + rt; dt),  = covf(1 + rt)2; d2tg and
  = covf(1 + rt)3; d3tg. Expression (A.2) is then written as
Edt+1 = (1  )E(1 + rt)Edt + (1  ) (A.3)
 covf(1 + rt)2; d2tg   E(1 + rt)2E(d2t )
  Ef(1 + rt)3d3tg   gEdt   
Applying the steady state denition Edt+1 = Edt = d to expression (A.3) yields:
d = (1  )(1 + r)d + (1  ) (A.4)
 (2r + (1 + r)2)(2d + d2)
    E((1 + rt)3d3t )  gd   
where 2d = E(d
2
t )   d2 and 2r = E(1 + rt)2   (1 + r)2 are both unconditional
33
variances and   covf(1 + rt)2; d2tg. Rearranging expression (A.4):
 E[(1 + rt)
3d3t ] + (
2
r + (1 + r)
2) d2 + [(1 + r)  (r   g)] d (A.5)
+(2r + (1 + r)
2)2d   (1  ) +  + 
= 0
The rst term in eq. (A.5) equals
E[(1 + rt)
3d3t ]
= covf(1 + rt)3; d3tg+ E(1 + rt)
3
E(dt)
3 (A.6)
=   + (r
3
r + 3(1 + r)
2
r   (1 + r)3)
(d3d + 3d2d   d3)
where    covf(1 + rt)3; d3tg and r and d are the third central moments of 1 + rt
and dt around their respective means. To expand the second term in (A.6) we
apply Ex3 = x
3
x + 3(Ex)
2
x   (Ex)3, where x = E

x Ex
x
3
and x is either
1+rt or dt. Substituting (A.6) into (A.5) and dividing through by  yields a cubic
polynomial in d:
(d)  d3 + a1d2 + a2d + a3 = 0 (A.7)
with coe¢ cients
a1 = (
2
r + (1 + r)
2)e
a2 = ((1 + r)  (r   g))e  32d
a3 = [  (1  ) +  + (2r + (1 + r)2)2d +   ]e (A.8)
 d 3d
34
where
e =    1[r3r + 32r(1 + r)  (1 + r)3] 1 (A.9)
Expression (A.7) is polynomial (d) in eq. (10) and its coe¢ cients (a1; a2; a3) are
given in eq. (11). The Mendoza and Ostry (2008) solution in eq. (5) follows as a
special case when all non-linear reaction terms in the debt rule are set to zero and
the linear coe¢ cient is modied to (1 + rt  g), rather than (1 + rt) as in (A.1).
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Appendix B. Expected debt ratio stability: proof of inequality (14)
Expressing the debt evolution in discrete time, dene G as
dt+1 = dt(1 + r   g)  f(dt) (B.1)
= G(dt)
where G is a continuous di¤erentiable function with d a xed point. Hence in
steady state G(d) = (1 + r   g)d   f(d), where f is the cubic debt rule in eq.
(6). That implies:
G0(d) = 1 + r   g   f 0(d) (B.2)
We now apply theorem 6.5 from Holmgren (1996), stated here without proof. If
j G0(d) j< 1 (B.3)
then there exists an open interval D containing d such that Gn(d) converges to
d for all d 2 D and n 2 Z. Conversely, if j G0(d) j> 1 then there exists an
open interval containing d such that all points in the interval that are not equal
to d must leave the interval under iteration of G. When G is the debt evolution
equation whose xed point is d, (B.3) becomes
 1 < 1 + r   g   f 0(d) < 1 (B.4)
The lower bound in (B.4) is unrealistic as it implies an innite net credit-output
ratio. We are then left with
f 0(d) > r   g (B.5)
which is the stability criterion in inequality (14). 
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Case II
Case III
Figure 1. Equilibrium Debt Ratios with Fiscal Fatigue
Figure 2. Endogenous Debt Limit and Fiscal Space
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